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Operators often fail to rely sufficiently on alarm systems. This results in a joint human-
machine (JHM) sensitivity below the one of the alarm system. The ‘confidence vs. trust
hypothesis’ assumes the use of the system depends on the weighting of both values.
In case of higher confidence, the task is performed manually, if trust is higher, the user
relies on the system. Thus, insufficient reliance may be due to operators’ overconfidence
in their own abilities and/or insufficient trust in the decision automation, but could be
mitigated by providing feedback. That was investigated within a signal detection task,
supported by a system with either higher sensitivity (HSS) or lower sensitivity (LSS)
than the human, while being provided with feedback or not. We expected disuse of
the LSS and insufficiently reliance on the HSS, in the condition without feedback.
The feedback was expected to increase reliance on the HSS through an increase in
trust and/or decreases in confidence, and thus, improve performance. Hypotheses
were partly supported. Confidence in manual performance was similar to trust in the
HSS even though humans’ sensitivity was significantly lower than systems’ sensitivity.
While confidence had not effect on reliance or JHM sensitivity, trust was found to be
positively related with both. We found disuse of the HSS, that could be improved through
feedback, increasing also trust and JHM sensitivity. However, contrary to ‘confidence vs.
trust’ expectations, participants were also found to make use of the LSS. This misuse
could not be reduced by feedback. Results indicate the use of feedback being beneficial
for the overall performance (with HSS only). Findings do not support the idea that
misuse or disuse of the system may result from comparison of confidence and trust.
We suppose it may rather be the product of users’ wrong strategy of function allocation,
based on the underlying idea of team work in combination with missing assignment of
responsibility. We discuss this alternative explanation.
Keywords: decision aid, alarm system, trust, confidence, feedback, function allocation
INTRODUCTION
In many safety-related work environments, such as process industries, aviation, or health care,
operators have to continuously monitor the situation and the underlying processes. They are usually
supported by alarm systems which warn them of critical events or deviations from the normal
operating state.
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Although there are very few accidents in high reliability
organizations (e.g., Roberts and Rousseau, 1989; Desai et al.,
2016; Schulmann, 2016; Martínez-Córcoles et al., 2018), the
consequences of accidents in such environments can be
severe. Unfortunately, accidents in these highly technologically
driven fields are often the result of inadequate responses
to available alarms (e.g., Bransby and Jenkinson, 1998;
Bliss, 2003; NTSB, 2006).
One common problem is the lack of reliance on the
alarm systems, which decreases performance (e.g., Bartlett
and McCarley, 2017). The current study aims to investigate
whether providing performance feedback represents an adequate
countermeasure to this problem. While some studies already
used feedback (e.g., Onnasch et al., 2014a), it has never been
systematically investigated, whether feedback really improves
reliance and thus performance. Furthermore, we want to
understand the effect of feedback on the underlying concepts of
self-confidence and trust.
The False Alarm Problem
One of the potential reasons for the disuse (i.e., insufficient use
of automation) of alarm systems is the frequency of false alarms
(Parasuraman and Riley, 1997). The reason for the large number
of false alarms in almost all safety-related work environments is
the fail-safe approach, which aims to minimize the number of
critical events that are missed (Swets, 1992). Alarm thresholds
are usually set very low, and systems generate alarms whenever
they detect the slightest deviation from the normal state. But in
most cases these alarms then turn out to be false. The frequent
experience of false alarms can decrease the operators’ trust in
alarm systems (e.g., Lee and See, 2004; Madhavan et al., 2006;
Rice, 2009). This can lead to the disuse of the system in terms of
longer reaction times and a decrease in the tendency to respond
to alarms (e.g., Bliss et al., 1995; Getty et al., 1995; Dixon et al.,
2007; Chancey et al., 2017) – what has been referred to as the cry
wolf phenomenon (Breznitz, 1984). Also the opposite effect can
be observed. In case of high trust, operators rely more on the
automation (e.g., Lees and Lee, 2007; Körber et al., 2018).
Disuse Through Miscalibration of
Information
Ideally, users should use alarm systems so that the joint human
machine (JHM) performance is better than the performance of
either the human or the alarm system alone (Sorkin and Woods,
1985). They should perform the task manually if their sensitivity
(discrimination ability) is higher than the system’s, because the
use of unreliable automation results in decreased performance
(Chavaillaz and Sauer, 2017). However, if the systems’ sensitivity
exceeds the users’, they should rely on the system, even though
it is not perfectly reliable. Accordingly, some researchers have
suggested a theoretical framework based on the ‘confidence vs.
trust hypothesis.’ That is, the use of the alarm system may
depend on the comparison of trust in the alarm system with
operators’ confidence regarding their own abilities. Whenever
trust in the system exceeds self-confidence, operators would rely
on the system, whereas when the level of trust was lower than the
level of self-confidence, they would base their decisions on their
own interpretation of the available information (Lee and Moray,
1992; Madhavan and Wiegmann, 2007).
However, most studies find a tendency to disuse automation.
That is, participants perform the task manually to a greater extent
than warranted and do not sufficiently use the advices of the
alarm system. As a consequence, the JHM performance has often
been found to be suboptimal in that the overall sensitivity was
lower than the sensitivity of the system alone (e.g., Dixon and
Wickens, 2006; Rice et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2014; Bailey, 2015;
Bartlett and McCarley, 2017). When participants notice that an
alarm system is not perfectly reliable, they often tend to reduce
compliance (Meyer, 2004) with alarms and rely on their own
ability to discriminate between critical and normal events. This
might be the result of miscalibration, either based on insufficient
trust or on overconfidence. The latter is a well-known bias in
decision-making research.
Overconfidence Bias in Behavioral
Decision-Making
A large body of literature on behavioral decision-making deals
with people’s ability to judge the quality of their own decision-
making. One consistent finding over the years has been the
appearance of overconfidence, defined as a tendency to be more
confident in the correctness of one’s own decisions than is actually
warranted (e.g., Yates, 1990; Harvey, 1997; Klayman et al., 1999).
Overconfidence represents a problem in many domains and was
investigated especially in economic and political decision making
(Ortoleva and Snowberg, 2015; Ringuest and Graves, 2017; Tsai
et al., 2018). One aspect of such overconfidence is the tendency to
overestimate one’s own performance in a task (Moore and Healy,
2008; Merkle and Weber, 2011), which is more pronounced for
difficult tasks than for easy ones (Larrick et al., 2007). In addition,
it has been found that if participants receive more information
relevant to the task, their overconfidence increases to a greater
extent than their accuracy (Tsai et al., 2008). However, there
are differences both in the degree of overestimation for different
tasks, as well as between individuals (Klayman et al., 1999).
Feedback as a Countermeasure for
Reducing Overconfidence
Some researchers have shown that providing performance
feedback is an operant way to reduce overconfidence (e.g.,
Arkes et al., 1987; O’Connor, 1989; van Loon and Roebers,
2017), whereas others did not find this positive effect of
feedback (e.g., Subbotin, 1996; Pulford and Colman, 1997;
Zamary et al., 2016). Stone and Opel (2000) found different
effects of various types of feedback. While a treatment that was
referred to as environmental feedback, representing a sort of
training with task-relevant information, led to an increase in
overconfidence, performance feedback on the actual decision-
making could reduce the overconfidence. Additionally, it was
shown that feedback about the reliability of the task-relevant
information could help to reduce overconfidence of the decision-
maker (Bregu, 2017).
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In alarm research, the effect of feedback on use and
performance has not yet been systematically investigated.
Nevertheless, different studies employed various ways to provide
feedback. The most common approach is to provide feedback
after each trial. This can either be done by directly notifying
the users about whether their decision was correct or not, or
by informing them if the indication given by the alarm system
was right or wrong (e.g., Bliss et al., 1995; Getty et al., 1995;
Madhavan et al., 2006; Dixon et al., 2007; McBride et al., 2011;
Rice and McCarley, 2011; Meyer et al., 2014). Some paradigms
provide indirect feedback, where the appropriateness of the
alarm and the participant’s decision can be inferred from cross-
checking underlying information (i.e., signal present or absent)
or by monitoring the further development of the situation (e.g.,
Bustamante et al., 2007; Bahner et al., 2008; Möller et al., 2011;
Onnasch et al., 2014a). A few studies did not give instant feedback
after each decision, but provided summarized feedback at the end
(e.g., Manzey et al., 2014; Wiczorek and Manzey, 2014), which
represents the condition in many real-world scenarios.
It is reasonable that feedback could improve system use, either
through the increase of trust in the automation, or through
the decrease of (over-)confidence, or even both. We consider it
important to understand these underlying mechanisms as base
for developing efficient ways of providing appropriate feedback
to users of alarm systems.
The Experiment
In the current experiment we aim to investigate the impact
of feedback when working with automation of different
sensitivity on the use of automation and resulting performance.
Furthermore, we want to understand whether these potential
effects result from changes in trust, confidence or both.
Two alarm systems with different sensitivity were used by
the participants in the current experiment and outcomes were
compared with the manual performance of the participants. The
systems are designed in a way that the sensitivity of the one
(high sensitivity system, HSS) exceeds the humans’ sensitivity,
while the sensitivity of the other system (low sensitivity system,
LSS) remains below. While the two alarm systems will be
modeled based on signal detection theory (SDT, Green and
Swets, 1966), the mean sensitivity of the human subjects can
be achieved through adaptation of stimulus material. The two
conditions (HSS vs. LSS) will be further divided in one group
receiving feedback and another group without. After training
the task alone, a manual performance block will be conducted,
followed by a system performance block with prior training
with the system. Sensitivity and reliance serve as objective
measures, complemented by subjective assessment of confidence
and trust. While confidence is usually measured through
participants’ estimated performance, trust is often assessed on
a multidimensional questionnaire. In order to compare both
measures with each other, we decided to assess both in the same
way using comparable single item scales. Hypotheses are:
H1: Following the ‘confidence vs. trust’ hypothesis, higher
confidence should reduce reliance on the system, while higher
trust should increase reliance. Thus, reliance should be positively
correlated with trust and negatively correlated with confidence.
H2: This should result in higher reliance on the HSS compared
to the LSS, which is expected to lead to manual performance.
H3: As a result, performance with the system should be higher
compared to manual performance when using the HSS and
there should not be a difference between manual and system
supported performance with the LSS. Accordingly, trust should
be positively correlated with performance, while confidence
should not. H5: However, in line with prior studies (e.g., Dixon
and Wickens, 2006; Rice et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2014), we
expect a certain disuse in terms of insufficient reliance on the
HSS, indicating a general tendency for overconfidence, that is
known from decision making research (e.g., Yates, 1990; Harvey,
1997; Klayman et al., 1999), and/or insufficient trust in the alarm
system. H6: Providing feedback should improve participants’ use
decisions. They should keep or even reduce the low reliance on
the LSS, while increasing reliance on the HSS. H7: This effect
should be achieved through an increase of trust in the system, or
a decrease of (over-)confidence, or both. H8: Changes in reliance
should rise performance. Thus, feedback should lead to a better
performance in terms of JHM sensitivity.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
“Tel Aviv University Ethics Committee for Research with
Human Subjects” approved the study under the name: “Decision
making with alerting systems” (no serial numbers available). All
procedures were performed in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki, in compliance with relevant laws, institutional
guidelines. Informed consent was obtained from each participant
and privacy rights were observed.
Participants
Eighty students from Tel Aviv University participated in the
experiment. We recruited the participants through ads that were
put out on campus and through student electronic bulletin
boards. We paid them a show-up fee for participating in the
experiment of 40 ILS (US $10). Additionally, participants took
part in a lottery of four times 100 ILS (about $28.00). Each point
in the performance score was a lottery ticket for this lottery,
so that participants had an incentive to collect as many points
as possible. Their background was in mechanical engineering,
industrial engineering and management, political science, and
biomedical engineering. Their ages ranged from 19 to 32 years
(M = 24.25, SD = 2.25), 43 were male and 37 female. They
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups of
20 participants each. They were informed about the purpose of
the study without receiving too much detailed information that
would affect the results.
Design
The experiment consisted of a 2 (Sensitivity) × 2 (Feedback)
between-subjects design. Half of the participants worked with
the LSS and the other half interacted with a HSS. Half of each
sensitivity group received visual feedback after each decision
during the experimental blocks, while the other half received no
feedback. All participants first conducted the task manually, as
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FIGURE 1 | Simulation environment.
a baseline, half of them with feedback, the other half without,
and then performed with the support of an alarm system. Before,
participants of all groups were trained manually and with the
system where all of them received feedback to get familiar with
the task and the automation.
Task
The simulation environment has been used before (Meyer et al.,
2014). Participants carried out a signal detection task on a 22′′
Screen. The task was introduced as a quality control task, similar
to those in manufacturing. Participants saw pictures containing
vertical bars until they responded or up to 20 s. Then the
simulation proceeded to the next picture. The lengths of the bars
in the pictures were drawn from two normal distributions with
different mean lengths. One distribution represented the intact
products and the other the faulty ones. The task was to decide
whether to sort out the product or to let it pass based on its
length. Participants had to indicate their decision by clicking the
corresponding button below the picture (see Figure 1).
In the system performance blocks, an automated decision aid
supported participants by showing a cue under the picture 1 s
after the picture onset. The cue was either a red or a green
horizontal bar with the word ‘Sort out’ or ‘Pass,’ respectively. In
the feedback conditions, visual feedback was provided after each
decision (i.e., ‘you were right’ vs. ‘you were wrong’).
Alarm Systems
While participants performed the task unaided in the manual
performance block, they were supported by one of two alarm
systems in the system performance block. Both systems were
designed based on SDT. The SDT derives of the field of
psycho physics. It describes the detection of signals in noisy
environments. Therefore, the noise and the signal (noise+signal)
are represented as two overlapping density distributions. SDT
allows the differentiation between the sensitivity and the criterion
(response bias) of the alarm system (Egan, 1975). The distance
between the two curves represents the sensitivity d’ of the system,
while the criterion c gives information regarding the systems
proclivity toward alarms or their absence. The two decision aids
differed with regard to their sensitivity d’. Both had a neutral
criterion c, leading to an equal number of misses and false
alarms. That was achieved by keeping the positive predictive
value (PPV) and the negative predictive value (NPV) equal. The
PPV represents the conditional probability of the presence of a
signal, given a red cue (Getty et al., 1995). The NPV indicates the
conditional probability of the absence of a signal, given a green
cue (Meyer and Bitan, 2002).
The underlying base rate of faulty products was 0.5. The HSS
had a PPV and NPV of 0.9, each, deriving from a d’ of 2.6. The LSS
had a PPV and NPV of 0.7 and a corresponding sensitivity of 1.05.
Creation of Stimuli
We designed the experiment so that participants would
encounter either an alarm system with a sensitivity higher than
their own or one with a sensitivity lower than their own. The
calculated medium PPV/NPV (between 0.9 and 0.7 of the two
systems) is 0.8. With the same base rate of 0.5 it results in a
set value of d’ = 1.68. This set value we tried to achieve by
manipulating the stimulus material (i.e., changing length of the
bars of the two distributions).
The final stimulus material was evaluated in a pretest with five
participants. The analysis showed a mean d’ of M = 1.65 with a
standard deviation SD = 0.15. One sample t-tests (two-tailed),
with the significance level set to p = 0.2 for null hypothesis testing,
indicated no difference between the calculated d’ = 1.68 and the
observed value, t(4) = −0.49, p = 0.648. Thus, it was decided to
use those pictures for the experiment.
Payoff
For every correct decision (i.e., letting an intact product pass
and sorting out a faulty product) participants gained ten points.
They lost ten points for every wrong decision (sorting out intact
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products or letting faulty ones pass). Participants could join a
lottery after the experiment, where their score determined the
probability of winning a small cash prize.
Measures
• Confidence ratings were assessed twice with a single item
questionnaire after the manual performance block and
again after the system performance block. Participants were
asked how confident they were regarding their decisions
during the previous block. Answers were assessed on a 5-
point Likert-scale, ranging from ‘not confident at all’ to
‘very confident.’
• Trust ratings were assessed twice with a single item
questionnaire after the system training block and again after
the performance block. Participants were asked how much
they trusted the system they had worked with. Answers
were assessed on a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from ‘not
at all’ to ‘very much.’
• We recorded participants’ decisions, and used these to
calculate behavior measures, based on SDT. Reliance
and compliance are the two different responses toward
the binary cues of an alarm system. According to
Meyer (2004) compliance refers to following the alarm
system in case it generates an alarm (e.g., red cue)
and engage in action, while reliance means refraining
from any action in the absence of an alarm (e.g., green
cue). Compliance and reliance were calculated using the
manual performance block (i.e., baseline) as reference, as
suggested by Meyer et al. (2014). The difference between
participants’ internal cut-off setting (i.e., criterion c) in
the manual performance block (cmanual) and their cut-off
settings in the system performance block with green and
red cues (csystem/green and csystem/red) constitutes reliance
and compliance, respectively. We calculated c using the
z-transformations of the hit-rate, which is based on the
proportion of hits out of all signal events, and the false
alarm-rate, which is based on the proportion of false alarms
out of all noise events:
pHit = hits
hits+misses (1)
pFA = FAs
FAs+ CRs (2)
c = −0.5 (z[pFA] + z[pHit]) (3)
compliance = cmanual − csystem/red (4)
reliance = csystem/green − cmanual (5)
Reliance is observed when participants’ cut-off with green
cues (i.e., indicating the decision to let the product pass) is
higher (i.e., more conservative) than their cut-off without any
cues. Compliance means the liberalization (i.e., lowering) of cut-
offs with red cues. Both have positive values, with higher values
indicating stronger compliance or reliance, pointing to a greater
tendency to follow the system’s advice.
• Sensitivity d’ was calculated (based on participants’
decisions using SDT) by subtracting the z-transformed hit-
rate from the z-transformed FA-rate:
d’ = z(pHit) – z(pFA) (6)
Sensitivity in the manual performance block describes
the human’s discrimination ability, while JHM d’ in
the system performance block represents the joint
human-machine sensitivity.
Procedure
The whole experiment lasted about 1 h. Participants first
signed a consent form and received standardized instructions
on a PC screen. The experiment consisted of a manual phase
(training block and performance block) and a system phase
(training block and performance block). Participants initially
performed a manual training (60 trials). During the training
phase all of them received online feedback after each decision
to become familiar with the task. They then performed the
manual experimental block consisting of 60 trials, with only
half of the participants receiving online feedback. Participants
then completed the confidence questionnaire. They were then
trained with the system they would use afterward. The system
training phase consisted of 80 trials, and all participants received
online feedback after each decision to become familiar with the
system. After the training they completed the trust questionnaire.
They then performed the system experimental block with 200
trials. Only half of the participants received online feedback.
After the system experimental block, participants completed
the confidence questionnaire and the trust questionnaire again.
At the end of the experiment, participants were thanked
and dismissed. They were also given the possibility to ask
questions about the study. An overview of the procedure is
displayed in Figure 2.
RESULTS
We used an alpha level of 0.05 for all statistical tests unless
otherwise stated. To analyze data from the system performance
block, we conducted ANOVAs with Sensitivity and Feedback
as between-subject factors, and with the Behavioral tendency,
compliance and reliance, as a within subject factor. We used
t-tests for independent samples (two-tailed) to analyze the data
from the manual performance block to compare the groups with
and without feedback, and for the trust assessments after the
system training phase to compare the groups with the HSS and
the LSS. T-tests were also used for post hoc comparisons, which
served to further investigate interaction effects and to compare
manual and system performance. Means and standard deviations
of all dependent measures can be found in Table 1.
Confidence Ratings
Manual Performance Block
The analysis did not reveal a significant difference between
the groups with feedback (M = 3.45) and without feedback
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FIGURE 2 | Procedure of the training and experimental blocks, and dependent measures.
TABLE 1 | Means (and standard deviations in brackets) of all dependent measures for the manual performance block and system performance block (separate for HSS
and LSS) with and without feedback.
Manual performance block (system training block) System performance block
With feedback Without feedback HSS LSS
With feedback Without feedback With feedback Without feedback
Confidence 3.5 (0.8) 3.4 (0.7) 4 (0.8) 3.2 (0.5) 3.3 (0.7) 3 (0.8)
Trust 3.4 (0.7) 2.5 (0.6) 3.4 (1.0) 3.3 (0.9) 2.1 (0.7) 2.4 (0.5)
Compliance – – 1.1 (0.6) 0.8 (0.6) 0.6 (0.5) 0.5 (0.4)
Reliance – – 1.2 (0.6) 0.6 (0.6) 0.5 (0.3) 0.2 (0.3)
Sensitivity d’ 1.8 (0.4) 1.8 (0.3) 2.5 (0.3) 2 (0.7) 1.6 (0.2) 1.6 (0.3)
Trust ratings in italics derive from the system training block.
FIGURE 3 | (A) Mean values of confidence in the manual performance block with and without feedback. (B). Mean values of confidence using HSS and LSS with
and without feedback.
(M = 3.40). The confidence in decisions did not differ as a
function of feedback.
System Performance Block
Analyses revealed significant main effects of Sensitivity
F(1,76) = 6.8, p = 0.011, η2p = 0.08, and of Feedback,
F(1,76) = 10.38, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.12. The interaction effect did
not reach significance.
Participants’ confidence was higher when receiving feedback.
That was true for the HSS (with feedback M = 4 vs. without
feedback M = 3.2), as well as for the LSS (with feedback
M = 3.3 vs. without feedback M = 3). On average, HSS led
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 March 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 519
fpsyg-10-00519 March 8, 2019 Time: 17:21 # 7
Wiczorek and Meyer Use of Decision Automation
FIGURE 4 | (A) Mean values of trust in the HSS and LSS after the training block. (B) Mean values of trust after using HSS and LSS with and without feedback in the
system performance block.
greater confidence than did LSS. Figures 3A,B depict the mean
values of confidence.
Additionally, we used one sample t-tests (two-tailed) to
compare the confidence of the system performance block
with the mean confidence of the manual performance
block (M = 3.48). The Bonferroni-corrected significance
level of p = 0.0125 was applied. When using the HSS with
feedback, confidence was significantly higher than when
performing the task manually t(19) = 3.21, p = 0.005.
Confidence in the other three conditions of the system
performance block did not differ significantly from the manual
performance block.
Trust Ratings
System Training Phase
Trust in the system, assessed after the training phase, was
analyzed with a t-test for independent samples (two-tailed),
comparing the two groups with HSS and LSS. Participants
who were trained with the HSS had more trust in the system
(M = 3.35) than those who were trained with the LSS (M = 2.53),
t(78) = 5.85, p< 0.001. Results can be seen in Figure 4A.
System Performance Block
The main effect of Sensitivity was found to be significant,
F(1,76) = 35.59, p < 0.001, η2pη2p = 0.32, while the main effect
of Feedback and the interaction effect were not. Trust in the
system was higher for the HSS (M = 3.33) than for the LSS
(M = 2.25), and feedback had no impact on trust. Results can be
seen in Figure 4B.
Additionally, we used one sample t-tests (two-tailed) to
compare trust assessed in the system training block with trust
assessed in the system performance block for trust in the HSS and
trust in LSS, separately. The Bonferroni-corrected significance
level of p = 0.025 was applied. Trust in HSS did not change
between training and performance block, whereas trust in LSS
decreased significantly, t(39) =−2.81, p = 0.009.
FIGURE 5 | Mean values of compliance with the HSS and the LSS with and
without feedback.
FIGURE 6 | Mean values of reliance on the HSS and the LSS with and without
feedback.
Comparison of Confidence and Trust
We used one sample t-tests (two-tailed) to compare the trust
ratings after the training phase with the mean confidence
of the manual performance block (M = 3.48) to investigate
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FIGURE 7 | (A) Mean values of human sensitivity d’ in the manual performance block with and without feedback. (B) Mean values of JHM sensitivity d’ using HSS
and LSS with and without feedback.
the ‘confidence vs. trust hypothesis.’ The Bonferroni-corrected
significance level of p = 0.025 was applied. It was found that
trust in the HSS did not differ significantly from confidence
in the manual performance block, while trust in the LSS was
significantly lower, t(39) =−10.9, p< 0.001.
Reliance and Compliance
System Performance Block
We found a significant main effect of Sensitivity, F(1,76) = 34.95,
p < 0.001, η2pη2p = 0.32, as well as a significant main effect of
Feedback, F(1,76) = 16.46, p < 0.001, η2pη2p = 0.18. Neither the
main effect of Behavioral Tendency, nor any of the interaction
effects reached significance. Both compliance and reliance were
higher for the HSS compared to the LSS. Feedback increased both
compliance and reliance compared to no feedback. Figures 5, 6
show the means for compliance and reliance.
Sensitivity (d’)
Manual Performance Block
The human sensitivity d’ did not differ significantly between the
group with feedback (M = 1.78) and the group without feedback
(M = 1.79). However, additionally one sample t-tests (two-
tailed) indicated that participants’ sensitivity d’ was significantly
lower than the one of the HSS, t(79) = −18.97, p < 0.001, as
well as significantly higher than the one of the LSS, t(79) =
17.79, p< 0.001.
System Performance Block
Analyses of the JHM d’ revealed significance for the main effect
of Sensitivity, F(1,76) = 46.32, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.38, for the main
effect of Feedback, F(1,76) = 6.81, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.08, and for
the interaction effect of Sensitivity × Feedback, F(1,76) = 6.26,
p = 0.02, η2pη2p = 0.08. Post hoc single comparisons were made
to further investigate the interaction effect by comparing the
two Feedback conditions (with and without feedback) separately
within each system sensitivity group. The Bonferroni-corrected
significance level of p = 0.025 was applied. In the HSS group a
significant difference was found for the conditions with feedback
(M = 2.48) and without feedback (M = 2), t(38) = 2.75, p = 0.009,
whereas in the LSS group the condition with feedback (M = 1.61)
and without feedback (M = 1.60) did not differ significantly.
The JHM sensitivity d’ was higher when participants used
the HSS compared to the LSS. Availability of feedback led to a
higher performance, but that was true only for the HSS group.
Figures 7A,B show the mean d’ values.
Additionally, one sample t-tests (two-tailed) were conducted
to compare the different JHM sensitivities with the mean human
sensitivity of the manual performance block (M = 1.79). The
Bonferroni-corrected significance level of p = 0.0125 was applied.
For the HSS, analyses revealed a significantly higher d’ with
feedback, t(20) = 11.87, p < 0.001, and no significant difference
without feedback. For the LSS, d’ values were significantly lower
both with feedback, t(20) = −4.53, p < 0.001, and without
feedback, t(20) =−3.39, p = 0.003.
Only the combination of a HSS and performance feedback
could improve d’ over manual performance. In contrast, the use
of the LSS did worsen performance.
Correlation of Trust and Confidence With
Behavior and Performance
Trust assessed in the training block was found to be positively
correlated with reliance, r = 0.31, p = 0.005, but not compliance
in the system performance block, and also positively correlated
with JHM d’ in the system performance block, r = 0.32, p = 0.004.
That means the higher the prior trust in the system the more
participants rely on the green cues (i.e., ‘Let pass’), which
rise JHM d’. In contrast, no correlation between confidence
in the manual performance block and compliance, reliance or
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d’ in the system performance block was found. Thus, trust
can serve as predictor of behavior and performance while
confidence does not.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the study was to investigate, whether performance
feedback has the potential to mitigate the disuse of alarm
systems, and to understand how the feedback affects the
underlying components of self-confidence and trust. We
compared participants’ use of assistance systems with high and
low sensitivity with and without feedback with regard to system
use and resulting performance, while assessing confidence in
participants’ decisions as well as trust in the system.
Behavior and Performance
When no feedback was available, participants made some use
of the HSS, as measures of compliance and reliance show, but
not in a sufficient way. JHM sensitivity did not significantly
differ from human sensitivity in the manual performance block,
and therefore remained much below the system’s sensitivity.
This finding corresponds to our hypothesis that participants
would not use the system sufficiently and is in line with prior
findings (Dixon and Wickens, 2006; Rice et al., 2010; Meyer
et al., 2014; Bailey, 2015; Bartlett and McCarley, 2017). Providing
online feedback led to significantly higher values of compliance
and reliance with the HSS, which significantly increased JHM
sensitivity. However, the performance value was still below the
sensitivity which could have been achieved when completely
relying on the system.
Participants who were supported by the LSS should have
done the task manually, ignoring the system as it could not
increase their sensitivity. However, they still did rely to some
extent on the system. This behavior was detrimental, because
the JHM sensitivity was significantly lower than participants’
unaided sensitivity. The availability of feedback had no significant
impact on participants’ behavior and the resulting performance
when using the LSS.
Confidence and Trust
Confidence ratings in the manual block did not differ as a
function of the availability of feedback. This result is in line
with other studies in not finding a confidence reducing effect
of feedback (e.g., Subbotin, 1996; Pulford and Colman, 1997).
However, the manual performance block was preceded by
training with feedback which corresponds to the two types of
feedback (environmental and performance) described by Stone
and Opel (2000). Thus, it is possible that the training block
already led to a reduction of preexisting overconfidence for all
the participants.
Trust in the system training block varied according to
system sensitivity. A comparison of confidence in the manual
performance block vs. trust in the system training block was
made to further investigate the ‘trust vs. confidence’ hypothesis
(e.g., Lee and Moray, 1992; Madhavan and Wiegmann, 2007).
Confidence of participants in their own decisions (M = 3.48) did
not differ significantly from trust in the HSS (M = 3.35) even
though system’s d’ exceeded the humans’ sensitivity (d’ = 2.6 vs.
d’ = 1.79, respectively). This miscalibration between confidence
and trust could either be the result of overconfidence or
undertrust. In any case, it was accompanied by the disuse of the
system. In contrast, while trust in the LSS was below confidence,
participants did not decide to do the task completely manually,
but rather they relied on the system to some extent. Thus, the
current experiment does not provide evidence for the ‘trust vs.
confidence’ hypothesis.
Contrary to prior effects of feedback on confidence (e.g.,
Arkes et al., 1987; O’Connor, 1989), the feedback did not
reduce confidence in the system performance block. Instead,
it led to an increase in confidence. However, confidence
reported after the system performance block referred to decision-
making in a task supported by an alarm system. Thus, it is
possibly an integration of participants’ and systems’ abilities
rather than confidence in participants’ abilities alone. In future
studies it is recommended to further discriminate between
contribution of system and contribution of human to the
overall confidence.
Unlike their confidence, participants’ trust ratings were
unaffected by feedback. Both confidence and trust increased as
a function of system sensitivity.
Correlations of trust and confidence with behavior and
performance also contradict the ‘confidence vs. trust’ hypothesis.
Prior trust was found to have a positive impact on reliance,
which is in line with previous studies (e.g., Lees and Lee, 2007;
Körber et al., 2018). However, no negative correlations with prior
confidence and compliance or reliance where found that could
have supported the hypothesis.
Potential Alternative Reasons for the
Non-optimal Use of Decision Aid
In the current study we found both disuse and misuse (i.e.,
exceeded use) of assistance systems. Thus, we conclude the
existence of a general tendency for miscalibration of the weight
given to information from a decision aid that can manifest
itself in different ways. It can lead to the insufficient use of
highly sensitive automation, as well as to the excessive use
of LSS. The miscalibration of trust and confidence may play
a role in this context. However, the current results do not
fully support this assumption, and other possible explanations
should be considered.
When comparing our results from human-machine
interaction with those from research on human-human
interaction, we found similar findings in the study of Bahrami
et al. (2010). They also showed that the combination of two
decision makers with different sensitivities remained below
the performance level of the better one. Additionally, they
could show that communication between the parties improved
performance even without feedback. This could imply that
beyond information about system reliability also information
regarding the validity of each single system advise would be
needed. This information enables the user to decide for each
trial, whether it is suitable to follow the systems advise. For
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this purpose the use of likelihood alarm systems had been
suggested. They communicate their own certainty regarding
their advise via graded warnings (e.g., Sorkin et al., 1988;
Wickens and Colcombe, 2007).
The current results also correspond with findings from Harvey
and Fischer (1997), who investigated whether decision-makers
that differ in expertise (novice, medium, experts) take advice
from others. The advice-givers also differed with regard to their
expertise on the same three levels. The authors conclude that
three different mechanisms explain the acceptance of advice.
The first mechanism described by Harvey and Fischer (1997)
is ‘avoidance of complete rejection.’ Even expert decision-
makers accepted approximately 20% of the advice given by
novices, because it had presumably been given with a positive
intention. This might resemble the unexpected use of the LSS
by participants in our experiment. Following this assumption,
it is possible that people feel the need to use a system that is
introduced to them as assistance or decision aid, even if the
quality of the system is low.
The second mechanism described by Harvey and Fischer
(1997) is a wish to ‘improve judgment.’ They found that
decision-makers increased their acceptance of advice when
advice-givers were more experienced, corresponding to our
participants relying more on the HSS than on the LSS. More
interestingly, their participants, similar to ours, did not use the
offered support sufficiently, as not even the novice decision-
makers took more than 40% of advice. Harvey and Fischer (1997)
explain this with overconfidence, which is analogous to our own
initial hypothesis.
However, an alternative explanation should be considered. It is
possible that when participants fail to rely sufficiently on a HSS,
they follow a similar rationale as those showing overreliance. If
the task is assigned to the operators and the system is only there to
assist, they might feel the need to contribute to the task regardless
whether this is beneficial or not to the overall performance. Thus,
the assignment of insufficient significance may be the result of
participants’ interpretation of teamwork, i.e., interaction. Perhaps
this problem arises when function allocation to the human
and the automation is not clearly defined. This assumption
also matches the third mechanism of ‘shared responsibility.’
Harvey and Fischer’s (1997) participants took more advice from
others when the task was important, i.e., the risk was high.
While we did not vary risk in the current study, Wiczorek and
Meyer (2016) showed an increase of manual performance in
a human-machine task as a function of risk. Both tendencies,
though pointing in different directions, again reflect the
concept of teamwork.
Thus, we assume that users’ wrong strategy of function
allocation is not the result of overconfidence but the product of
participants trying to integrate decisions of both agents in the task
to interact as a team.
Implications for Improving Function
Allocation
Our results have several potential implications for the allocation
of functions to humans and automation in decision tasks. Firstly,
operators supported by decision aids may have a tendency to
follow at least some of the advice, and they will also try to
contribute to the task themselves. This behavior possibly results
from their perception of function allocation, which is based on
the idea of teamwork. It will in most cases lead to non-optimal
performance (by either assigning too much or too little weight to
the information from the decision aid).
Secondly, it may be possible to increase or reduce the
reliance on automation in a decision-making task by varied
responsibility assignments. This could be done for instance by
changing, the level of automation (LOA, Sheridan and Verplank,
1978), at which the aid supports the user. A meta-analysis of
Onnasch et al. (2014b) could find effects of LOA on different
dependent measures such as workload, situation awareness, etc.
As tasks in these studies represent monitoring instead of quality
control tasks and systems had very high reliabilities, they were
rather focusing on misuse resulting from complacency (see
Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010) than on disuse of alarm systems
(Parasuraman and Riley, 1997). Thus, the effect of LOA on
compliance and reliance with decision automation should be
invested in future studies.
Thirdly, humans and decision aids should only form a team
when their abilities complement each other. That is the case when
both agents base their decisions on different parameters or apply
different decision algorithms. If they do not do so, the task should
be assigned to the agent with the higher sensitivity.
Lastly, when improvement through complementation is
possible, but system sensitivity is much above human sensitivity,
methods should be provided to use the human’s expertise, while
maintaining the benefits from the high system reliability. This
could be achieved by informing operators about the relative
competence of each partner and training them to identify
situations that are difficult for the system and easy for them, or
vice versa. An alternative approach would be the use of likelihood
alarm systems (e.g., Sorkin et al., 1988). The users can comply
with the high likelihood alerts and do the task manually when the
system generates alerts with a low likelihood to be correct, as has
been shown by Wiczorek and Manzey (2014). In a more advanced
version, the system could execute the task automatically when it
is certain and only involve the operator in the decision process
when it is uncertain. This approach would have the additional
benefit of reducing operators’ workload.
Limitations
One common limitation that a lot of studies dealing with human-
machine interaction faces, it the use of student samples. Real
operators are highly trained and possess a lot of experience with
their automation, unlike the student volunteers. However, given
that the reason for this type of research are real world problems, it
is likely to assume that basic behavioral mechanisms and attitudes
follow similar mechanisms across operators and students.
Another limitation of the current study is the assessment
of confidence after the system performance block. As it
was a JHM performance, it is not possible to understand
to what extend the indicated confidence derives from the
participant’s contribution and the system’s contribution. Future
studies may investigate alternative ways of assessing these two
components separately.
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CONCLUSION
When interacting with assistance systems, participants tend to
underuse HSSs but overuse low sensitivity ones. Feedback was
shown to improve use in the case of HSSs, but not with the
LSSs. However, we assume there are not too many reasons
to provide operators with a system that performs below their
own abilities. If this should happen, feedback will not help to
improve user decisions.
Results of the current study do not support the ’confidence vs.
trust’ hypothesis. As participants’ decisions fit only one part of
our hypothesis (i.e., they do not sufficiently use the HSS), and
not the other part (i.e., they do not rely on manual performance
with the low-sensitivity system, but rather use its indications
excessively), we no longer believe overconfidence to be the (main)
reason for effects of disuse. Rather, we suggest that the observed
under- and overuse is the result of a wrong strategy of function
allocation that is based on the idea of teamwork without clear
assignment of responsability. This problem may be resolved by
providing additional information regarding function allocation
(e.g., assigning explicit levels of automation).
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